Did Mossad really groom Ahmadinejad—or is this a psy-op?

Every intelligence leak has two dimensions: what it reveals and what it is designed to achieve. The New York Times's story that Israel's Mossad secretly groomed former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to lead a post-Islamic Republic Iran is one of the most sensational intelligence stories to emerge from the Middle East in years. But before asking whether every allegation is true, it is worth asking why such a story emerged precisely as Iran enters a sensitive post-Khamenei transition.

That timing raises an intriguing possibility. Even if elements of the report are accurate, its disclosure could itself be part of an information campaign aimed at discrediting Ahmadinejad, deepening suspicion within Iran's ruling elite and reminding Tehran that Mossad's reach extends to the highest levels of the Islamic Republic. If true, it would rank among the most audacious intelligence operations in Middle Eastern history. If not entirely accurate, or if selectively leaked, it could itself be part of a carefully crafted psychological operation.

Intelligence leaks rarely emerge in a political vacuum. They are often timed to achieve objectives beyond merely informing the public. They can discredit political figures, deepen mistrust within rival power centres, demonstrate the reach of an intelligence service or shape political narratives during periods of transition. In Iran, where the succession following the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has opened a new chapter in the country's politics, the timing of the story deserves as much scrutiny as its content.

The report paints an extraordinary picture. It claims Mossad chief David Barnea personally met Ahmadinejad in Budapest, maintained contacts through overseas meetings, extracted him from his residence during Israeli strikes, sheltered him in a safe house in Tehran and intended to install him as the leader of a transitional government after the collapse of the Islamic Republic.

If accepted at face value, it reads more like the plot of a spy thriller than a conventional intelligence operation. That alone does not make it false. Intelligence history is full of astonishing operations that initially sounded implausible. Yet extraordinary claims require equally compelling evidence, and this story raises several questions that remain unanswered.

The first concerns Ahmadinejad himself. For much of his presidency, he was arguably Israel's most outspoken adversary. He questioned the Holocaust, championed Iran's nuclear programme and became synonymous with anti-Israel rhetoric. The report argues that he underwent a profound political transformation after leaving office and grew increasingly critical of the clerical establishment. That may well be true. But criticism of Iran's leadership is not the same as becoming willing to cooperate with Mossad. The public evidence presented so far does not bridge that considerable gap.

Even more puzzling is the question of political viability. Regime-change planners usually seek figures who possess broad legitimacy or at least the capacity to unite competing factions. By 2026, Ahmadinejad had alienated almost every major political constituency in Iran. The establishment no longer trusted him. Reformists viewed him with hostility because of the disputed 2009 election and the crackdown that followed. Even within conservative circles, he had become increasingly isolated after repeated clashes with Ayatollah Khamenei. If Israel truly hoped to shape a post-Islamic Republic government, why choose a politician whose domestic support appeared to have largely evaporated?

Another unanswered question concerns Mossad itself. According to the report, Mossad chief David Barnea personally travelled to Budapest to meet Ahmadinejad, reportedly even missing a high-level security meeting in Israel. Intelligence chiefs rarely conduct initial meetings with potential assets. Such contacts are normally delegated to experienced case officers to preserve operational security and plausible deniability. If Barnea indeed attended personally, it suggests Ahmadinejad was already regarded as an asset of exceptional importance. Yet the report does not explain how that level of confidence was established.

The operational details become even more difficult to reconcile. The report claims Mossad rescued Ahmadinejad after Israeli strikes and concealed him in a safe house inside Tehran. If he had become Israel's most valuable political asset inside Iran, why leave him in one of the world's most heavily monitored capitals rather than move him across the border? Keeping him inside Tehran would expose him to surveillance by the Revolutionary Guards, electronic monitoring and eventual capture. The report offers no convincing explanation for such an extraordinary operational decision.

Even stranger is the reported conclusion of the operation. According to the account, Ahmadinejad became disillusioned with the plan, simply left the safe house and was subsequently detained by Iranian authorities. If he was central to Israel's strategy for post-regime Iran, it is difficult to understand how such a valuable asset could simply walk away. Intelligence agencies invest enormous resources in protecting high-value assets. The report provides little insight into how this supposedly critical operation unravelled so easily.

Then there is Tehran's reaction — or rather, its lack of one.  If Iran had genuinely uncovered a former president collaborating with Mossad, one might have expected televised confessions, criminal charges, relentless propaganda campaigns and wall-to-wall state media coverage. Instead, official silence prevailed. Ahmadinejad even appeared publicly at Ayatollah Khamenei's funeral. His office has since categorically denied the allegations, while Iranian authorities have neither confirmed nor comprehensively rebutted the report.

Finally, there is the question of sourcing. The New York Times is one of the world's most respected newspapers, and its national security reporting has often proved accurate. But this story rests almost entirely on anonymous Israeli, Iranian and American officials. No documents have been produced. No recordings, photographs or travel records have been made public. There is no independent corroboration of the alleged meetings. In intelligence reporting, anonymous sourcing is sometimes unavoidable. Yet the more extraordinary the claim, the greater the need for corroborating evidence.

None of this proves that the story is false. Intelligence operations often remain hidden for decades, and many of the most remarkable episodes in espionage history were initially dismissed as implausible.

But it does suggest that readers should approach the report with caution rather than certainty.

Perhaps the more revealing question is not whether Mossad really intended to install Ahmadinejad as Iran's next leader. It is why this story emerged now. If the objective was to destroy Ahmadinejad's remaining political credibility, sow suspicion within Iran's fractured elite or advertise the depth of Israeli intelligence penetration, then the leak itself may already have achieved its purpose —regardless of whether every detail of the operation can ever be verified.

In the shadow war between Israel and Iran, information is often as potent as missiles. Sometimes the most effective intelligence operation is not the one that remains secret, but the one that everyone is talking about.

Views expressed are personal