Grandson has no birthright in father's share of grandfather's property: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has ruled that a grandson cannot claim a birthright in property inherited by his father from his grandfather under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, once the property has been partitioned among the grandfather's Class I heirs. The court held that the share allotted to the father through such a partition becomes his exclusive property, held in his individual capacity, and does not automatically form part of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF).

A bench comprising Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice Sunita Agarwal delivered the ruling while dismissing an appeal filed by a son who had sought a half share in a parcel of land allotted to his father during the partition of his grandfather's estate. The father had subsequently sold the property to two purchasers.

The judgment, delivered on November 6 in J. Rajesh (Minor) through his mother J. Gomathi v. M. Kumaran (Dead) through LRs and Others (Civil Appeal No. 7020 of 2012), reiterates that property inherited by a son under Section 8 is held by him in his individual capacity and does not confer an automatic coparcenary right on his own children.

How the property dispute began

The dispute originated in a partition suit filed in 1997 by the appellant, who was then a minor and represented by his mother, his natural guardian. He sought partition and possession of half the share in a parcel of land measuring 1,811 square feet, claiming that it was joint family property inherited by his father from his grandfather.

The appellant's aunt had earlier instituted proceedings seeking partition of their grandfather N. Ramakrishnan's property. The dispute was settled through a compromise in 1994, under which the appellant's father, Defendant No. 1 (D1), received the land in question. The appellant was also born in 1994.

Subsequently, in 1997, D1 executed sale deeds transferring the land to two purchasers, Defendant No. 2 (D2) and Defendant No. 3 (D3).

The City Civil Court in Chennai initially passed a preliminary decree allowing the partition claim. However, the purchasers challenged the decision before the First Appellate Court, which overturned the decree. It held that property inherited by a son under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act becomes his absolute property and that his own son does not acquire any right by birth in it.

The Madras High Court subsequently upheld this position, ruling that the appellant had not acquired a birthright in the property allotted to his father following the partition of his grandfather's estate. It consequently rejected his claim for partition.

The appellant then approached the Supreme Court. The bench noted that neither the 1994 compromise decree nor the sale deeds executed in 1997 had been challenged. The relief sought before it was limited to partition and possession of a half share in the land.

Son argues that father held property as coparcenary asset

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant relied on Section 29A of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989, to argue that the compromise decree did not convert his father's share into self-acquired property.

He contended that his father continued to hold the land as the karta of a coparcenary and that the property retained its joint family character. He further argued that the two purchasers could not acquire a better title than the seller.

The appellant also questioned the validity of the sale, arguing that his father had not established any legal necessity for transferring the property. His father, who remained ex parte during the proceedings, died in 2024.

To support his arguments, the appellant relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh and Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur.

The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the dispute concerned succession to the grandfather's estate under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, rather than the continuation of a coparcenary. They submitted that neither Section 6 of the Act nor Section 29A of the Tamil Nadu amendment applied to the facts.

They also pointed out that the appellant had never challenged the 1994 compromise decree or the subsequent sale deeds. The purchasers were described as bona fide buyers, while the suit itself was alleged to be collusive.

Supreme Court explains why Section 8 applies

Examining the rival submissions, the bench relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in CWT v. Chander Sen, which established that when a son inherits property from his father under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, he receives it in his individual capacity and not as the karta of his own undivided family.

The judges emphasised that the statutory provisions governing succession could not be overlooked in favour of the traditional understanding of ancestral property.

"Express words of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be ignored and must prevail," the bench observed.

The court also referred to Bhanwar Singh v. Puran, in which it was held that a joint coparcenary does not continue after partition among the heirs of a grandfather. It further relied on Radha Bai v. Ram Narayan which clarified that a grandson or granddaughter is excluded from the Class I heirs when the father is alive.

The bench explained that a son's son is not independently included in the list of Class I heirs under the Hindu Succession Act. While the son of a predeceased son is recognised as a Class I heir, the son of a living son does not have the same entitlement.

"A son's son is not mentioned as an heir under Class I of the Schedule, and, therefore he could not get any right in the property of his grandfather under the provision," the judgment stated.

The court added that the right which a grandson enjoyed under traditional Hindu personal law to claim an interest in his grandfather's property during his father's lifetime was not expressly preserved when Parliament enacted the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

It held that Section 8 must be treated as a self-contained provision governing the devolution of property belonging to a Hindu male who dies intestate.

Partition ended the joint family character of the property

Applying these principles, the bench held that following the grandfather's death, his property devolved upon his Class I heirs simultaneously, in accordance with the order of succession prescribed under the Act.

The property did not become Hindu Undivided Family property belonging to the appellant's father and his own branch, including the grandson.

Under the 1994 compromise decree, each heir became the exclusive owner of the property allotted to them. The heirs held their respective shares as tenants in common rather than joint tenants, and the earlier coparcenary ceased to continue in respect of the partitioned property.

The bench observed that the grandfather's estate had already devolved upon his legal heirs before the appellant could claim any interest in it. The partition proceedings had commenced in 1993, and the appellant could not claim that a coparcenary interest had devolved upon him in the property.

The judges also rejected the reliance on Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act and Section 29A of the Tamil Nadu amendment. They noted that the appellant could not be treated as a surviving coparcener at the time of his grandfather's death. Consequently, neither provision could confer the claimed birthright in the circumstances of the case.

Supreme Court dismisses appeal

The bench also took note of the fact that the appellant's 1997 suit was filed after the partition proceedings and the execution of the sale deeds. He had sought a half share on the basis of an alleged coparcenary right by birth without directly challenging either the compromise decree or the subsequent transfers.

Concluding that the father had become the exclusive owner of the land allotted to him, the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the Madras High Court's decision.

It reiterated that the property received by the father through the partition of his grandfather's estate had become his individual property and could not be treated as coparcenary property merely because the appellant was his son.

"The appeal, thus, failed and hence stands dismissed with no order as to costs," the bench ruled. All pending applications were also disposed of.