Future of Quad in question amid US pivot, China rapprochement and ‘G2’ power talk

The Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, met in New Delhi on 26 May 2026 for the much-awaited Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting hosted by India to affirm their support for ‘a free and open Indo-Pacific’ that allows countries to develop resilience and strengthen capacity to determine their own paths. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) partners reiterated their commitments to working with regional partners to address a wide-ranging geo-political challenges through tangible initiatives focused on the four key pillars of Quad: maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response.

The four partner countries of Quad, established in 2007, announced new initiatives on maritime surveillance, critical mineral supply chains, and energy security. In a statement, the Quad foreign ministers also said they “remain seriously concerned about the situation” in the disputed South China Sea and the East China Sea. “We reiterate our strong opposition to any destabilising or unilateral actions, including by force or coercion that threaten peace and stability in the region,” they added. The foreign ministers of the Quad grouping agreed to jointly build a port in Fiji and signed pacts covering critical ‌minerals and energy security. The initiative could be significant for Japan after China halted shipments of some minerals used in aerospace, defence, and semiconductor industries following a diplomatic dispute.

China strongly criticised the Quad alliance, warning the group against targeting other countries. Reacting to the Quad’s meet, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning told a news briefing, “We do not support exclusive ‘small circles’ or bloc confrontation, and no cooperation should undermine mutual trust and cooperation among countries in the region. We have always believed that cooperation between countries should help promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity and should not target any third party,” she added.

Waning significance of Quad

The origins of Quad 1.0 lie in the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the four countries formed the “Tsunami Core Group” to coordinate the emergency response and humanitarian assistance. In the subsequent years, there were efforts to institutionalise the Quad, spearheaded by Abe Shinzo during his first term as prime minister of Japan from 2006 to 2007. Abe’s rationale for the Quad was to defend the international rules-based order, implying that China had become a threat to that order. Beijing, too, perceived it as an initiative aimed at containing its rise. It quickly sent formal notes of concern to the four foreign ministries in 2007. Beijing argued that the Quad forms part of a U.S.-led effort of “containment and suppression” and worries an “Indo-Pacific North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” will emerge.

Initially, the Quad meetings were restricted to a Ministerial dialogue. Only in 2021 was it upgraded to Quad Summit. The 2025 Summit was scheduled in India, which got cancelled as the four-nation group had lost some momentum last year after failing to hold a leaders' summit, amid tensions between U.S. President Donald ⁠Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi over Washington's tariffs and other matters. While the four Foreign Ministers did not address the press directly after the New Delhi meet, as has been the convention, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Australian Minister, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry each held separate briefings during the day, refuting questions on whether the Quad had lost some of its importance and whether leaders of the grouping were now engaging more with other multilateral formations.  As no specific date has been announced for the next Quad Summit, there is speculation that the Quad will be downgraded to a Foreign Minister-level meet or occur on the sidelines of other gatherings.

After the George W. Bush presidency, which was centered on the war in Iraq and the Middle East, the Obama administration launched what it called a “pivot” to Asia in 2011, with the aim of developing stronger military, diplomatic, and economic ties with the region. As part of the pivot, the Obama White House deepened engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The administration also upgraded alliances with South Korea, Japan, and Australia, and created a much closer partnership with Vietnam. It planned to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a massive, region-wide trade deal, though the U.S. ultimately did not join the TPP.

During the first Donald Trump administration, the policymakers revived the largely dormant Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The Trump administration, along with its partners, turned the Quad into a productive forum for regional strategic dialogue. The White House also, in its National Security Strategy, clearly viewed China as a competitor, saying that Beijing was attempting to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour.” The Trump Administration imposed export controls on sending a wide range of high-technology items to China. It also deepened ties to India, with Trump hosting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a boisterous gathering in Texas.

When Joe Biden became president, his administration maintained—and even hardened—some of Trump’s policies toward China, while deepening ties to Pacific partners in other ways. Indeed, Biden toughened export controls and also built close defence ties with the Philippines, a key U.S. ally in the region. Biden also publicly announced that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, a major statement.

However, the second Trump administration, since January 2025, seems ready to abandon what had been a bipartisan approach to the Indo-Pacific. The recent National Security Strategy (NSS), released in November 2025, makes clear that the White House’s top priority is maintaining U.S. dominance of the Western Hemisphere, and spends relatively little time talking about the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific. The Pentagon’s 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS)also no longer views China as a top security priority. The Trump administration has further cast doubt on the reliability of its defence relationships with some of its closest partners in Asia, such as Japan. Further, despite close ties in his first administration, the second Trump administration has seen a rapid downgrade of links with India, a major regional player and one that multiple administrations had cultivated.

Speaking at a major international security forum,  the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 30, U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth delivered a blunt message to America's allies, declaring that the era of 'freeloading' on U.S. military power is over. Hegseth urged partners across the Indo-Pacific and beyond to take greater responsibility for their own defence and increase military spending.

The United States began shifting its armada from the Asia Pacific to the Middle East at the outset of its war on Iran alongside Israel in February. During Epic Fury — the US military operation launched on February 28 against Iran — US forces spent more than half of their pre-war stockpile of four critical munitions. Meanwhile, the rapprochement between Trump and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, marked by a growing reconciliation between the two powers through trade deals, and the first visit by a US president to China in nearly a decade, a few weeks before the Delhi Quad meet,   have rattled Quad countries, raising questions over its future.

G2: a two-power structure led by the USA and China

Donald Trump floated the "G2" concept at a US-China summit in South Korea in October 2025. Japan fears that a closer US–China relationship could sideline Tokyo and upset Asia's security balance, especially if Trump makes concessions on issues including Taiwan. On May 14, the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Trump's references to a "G2"—a two-power structure led by the United States and China, and his notably conciliatory tone toward Xi, made Japan visibly anxious. Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said at a press conference the same day: "We believe it is important that US-China relations contribute to the stability of the international community, including Japan, and we are closely monitoring the situation with great interest."

For decades, Japan has relied on the cohesion of its alliance with the US to counter China, which has been expanding its maritime presence in the East and South China Seas and adopting an increasingly hegemonic posture. Now, Tokyo is worried about increased Chinese military activity in the Indo-Pacific, including the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. To Japanese defence strategists, Beijing is ranked as the top national security threat above North Korea and Russia since 2019.

Another significant shift in the USA’s Indo-Pacific policy is the indirect recognition of China’s territorial rights on Taiwan. In an interview in Beijing with Fox News, following the China-US summit, President Trump, when discussing the Taiwan question, said, "I'm not looking to have somebody go independent ... we're not looking to have somebody say, let's go independent because the United States is backing us." He also stressed the distance involved, claiming that he was not looking for the US to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. The US President Trump’s warning against "Taiwan independence" has sent shockwaves through Taiwan's political circles. While pro-Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) outlets have largely attempted to downplay the remarks, a vice chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) characterised the speech as a severe blow to the DPP.

As a strategic retreat from the Indo-Pacific region, it appears that the USA has dumped its long-trusted allies –Japan and India. Although the India-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEPA) Agreement came into effect on 1 August 2011, in 2025-26 India's trade with Japan hovered around USD 27.5 billion compared to a record USD 151.1 billion with China. India's imports from China stood at USD 131.63 billion, while exports rose to USD 19.47 billion. Japanese FDI in India remains small compared to Japan's total outward FDI. Japanese outward FDI to India in 2023-24 and 2024-25 stood at USD 3.1 billion and USD 2.48 billion, respectively, with USD 3.2 billion in 2025-26 (up to December 2025). Despite very cordial relations with Japan, India has failed to develop strong economic ties with the country.

Three East Asian major economies: China, Japan, and South Korea. Japan and South Korea are members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) -the world's largest trade bloc, which India decided to walk out of. Two other Quad members, Australia and Japan, are members of the China-backed RCEP. As the WTO has become almost defunct,  India should consider joining this Indo-Pacific trade bloc and play a constructive role in shaping global trade policies in this fast-changing geopolitical game.