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Bilkis Bano case: SC's sentence suspension raises questions over victim's right to be heard in court

Bilkis Bano case: Why the victim's voice matters in the SC's sentence suspension decision

The Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the life sentences of two convicts in the Bilkis Bano gangrape and murder case has renewed concerns over procedural fairness, the rights of survivors and the principles governing relief to those convicted of heinous crimes.

On October 28, a bench comprising Justices MM Sundresh and Prasanna B Varale suspended the sentences of Bipinchand Kanaiyalal Joshi and Pradip Ramanlal Modhiya, granting them bail pending their appeals. The court cited their incarceration of more than 17 years and the fact that one of the appellants was severely handicapped. It also observed that questions of fact and law remained to be examined in the appeals.

The order, which was only two pages long, has drawn criticism because, according to Bilkis Bano, she was neither informed nor heard before the relief was granted. In a statement issued through her lawyer on November 16, the survivor expressed shock at learning about the order through media reports and said she would challenge it.

The latest development has brought into focus a fundamental question: can a victim of a crime of this magnitude be left out of proceedings that directly affect the liberty of those convicted?

A survivor who has repeatedly sought justice

Bilkis Bano was 21 years old and five months pregnant when she was gang-raped during the 2002 Gujarat riots. The violence was driven by communal hatred and resulted in the murder of members of her family.

Her mother and a cousin who had recently given birth were also gang-raped and killed. Eight minors, including a two-day-old infant, were murdered. Bano’s three-year-old daughter was killed after her head was smashed. Her two minor brothers, two minor sisters, other relatives and three cousins were among those killed.

The Bombay High Court, while upholding the conviction of 11 men in the case, had observed that truth and falsehood had become so intertwined that the truth was buried beneath deliberate laxity, omissions, contradictions and falsehood at successive stages of the investigation.

The trial court had sentenced all 11 accused to rigorous imprisonment for life. The Bombay High Court upheld the convictions on May 4, 2017.

Bano has approached the Supreme Court on several occasions, seeking justice and challenging decisions that affected her and the convicts. The latest order has once again left her questioning whether the legal system has adequately recognised the person who suffered the consequences of the crime.

Why the victim’s participation matters

The principle that a victim is not merely a spectator in criminal proceedings has been firmly established in Indian jurisprudence. Criminal cases may traditionally be prosecuted by the State, but the victim has a recognised and enforceable right to participate in proceedings.

In Mallikarjun Kodagali v State of Karnataka, the Supreme Court recognised the victim’s right to appeal against an acquittal. The jurisprudence was further clarified in the Lakhimpur Kheri violence case, Jagjeet Singh and Others v Ashish Mishra @ Monu and Another.

In that case, the Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to Ashish Mishra, son of former Union Minister Ajay Mishra, and remanded the matter to the Allahabad High Court after finding that the victims had been denied an opportunity to be heard.

A three-judge bench held that a victim has a legally vested right to participate at every stage after the commission of an offence, extending from investigation to the conclusion of proceedings in an appeal or revision. The Court specifically recognised the right to be heard in bail proceedings.

The principle has subsequently been applied in other cases. In the Unnao rape case, where the CBI challenged the bail granted to former BJP MLA Kuldeep Singh Sengar, the victim was permitted to be impleaded as a party.

Similarly, in Ms X v State of Maharashtra (2023), the Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to a businessman accused of rape. It held that the presence of the State in proceedings could not diminish the prosecutrix’s right to be heard. The Court emphasised that this right becomes particularly important in serious offences where the prosecutrix is often the principal witness.

The underlying principle is that a fair and effective hearing, rooted in audi alteram partem, or the right to hear the other side, is a cornerstone of natural justice.

The statutory protection for victims

The right to be heard is not merely a judicially evolved principle. It has also been recognised through statutory provisions.

In Bhagwant Singh v Commissioner of Police (1985), the Supreme Court held that an informant who sets the criminal law in motion, and who may also be a victim, must be given an effective opportunity of hearing before a decision is taken.

The Code of Criminal Procedure subsequently incorporated a specific provision requiring notice to the informant or victim in certain bail proceedings. Section 439(1A) of the CrPC made such a hearing mandatory in cases involving offences punishable under specified provisions, including rape of a minor. The corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is Section 483(2).

The Delhi High Court has also extended the statutory protection in cases involving rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. It set aside a bail order passed by a trial court without issuing notice to the prosecutrix, holding that she had a right to be heard.

These precedents raise serious questions about the procedure followed in the Bilkis Bano matter, particularly when the survivor has repeatedly sought to participate in proceedings concerning the convicts.

Suspension of a life sentence is not routine relief

The power to suspend a sentence pending appeal is governed by Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although courts have discretion to grant such relief, the power cannot be exercised mechanically. It requires careful consideration of the nature of the offence, the circumstances of the case and the relevant grounds advanced by the convict.

In Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai and Others v State of Gujarat (1999), the Supreme Court underscored the need for courts to record reasons while suspending sentences.

The legal position is particularly cautious where the conviction concerns murder, rape or other grave offences.

In Shivani Tyagi v State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), the Supreme Court observed that suspension of sentence may ordinarily be considered in cases involving short-term imprisonment. The position, however, is different in serious offences, especially where the sentence is life imprisonment.

The Court made it clear that the period of incarceration alone cannot justify suspension of sentence, as doing so would undermine legislative intent, public interest and social security. This principle was reiterated in Rajesh Upadhyay v State of Bihar (2025).

Another Supreme Court bench, in Hanuman Prasad @ Hanuta Ram v State of Rajasthan (2026), observed that a sentence imposed for a heinous offence cannot be suspended merely because the appeal is unlikely to be heard within a reasonable period.

The Bilkis Bano case involves particularly grave charges, including Sections 143, 147, 148, 302 read with 149, and 376(2)(e) and 376(2)(g) of the IPC. The crimes involved gangrape, multiple murders and the killing of children, including a two-day-old infant.

In such circumstances, the grounds for suspension of sentence require careful scrutiny, and the survivor’s opportunity to respond to the convicts’ submissions assumes particular significance.

The history of remission and the Supreme Court’s intervention

The two convicts who have now received relief were among the 11 men whose premature release in August 2022 triggered widespread public outrage.

The Gujarat government had granted them remission on the grounds of good behaviour. A batch of petitions challenged the decision, and in January 2024, the Supreme Court quashed the remission orders.

The Court held that Gujarat was not the competent government to consider the remission applications. Since the convicts had been sentenced by a special court in Mumbai, Maharashtra was the appropriate government under the law. Gujarat had effectively usurped the jurisdiction of Maharashtra.

The Court also recorded that the convicts had enjoyed liberal parole and furlough periods during their incarceration. It found that one of them had abused the process of the Court and that the remission decision had been secured through fraud.

While restoring the convicts to prison, the Supreme Court observed that allowing convicted persons to circumvent the consequences of their convictions would undermine peace and public confidence in the justice system. It stressed that courts must consider not merely the spelling of justice, but its substance.

The Court further held that the convicts’ plea for protection of liberty could not prevail in the circumstances, and that the rule of law had to be upheld.

Bano’s case had earlier been transferred from Gujarat to Maharashtra on her plea, in view of concerns about the fairness of the trial. The Supreme Court’s 2024 remission judgment also highlighted the importance of the victim’s rights and the need to balance them against claims of reform and liberty by convicts.

Questions over the latest proceedings

The two convicts challenged the Bombay High Court judgment upholding their convictions and sought suspension of sentence. Their submissions reportedly included that they had not been named in the initial FIR and that the evidence against them was based on their alleged membership of a mob.

One of the appellants was said to have been implicated nearly three years after the incident. The defence also relied on the period of incarceration and the severe physical handicap of one convict.

The present opinion raises a further question about the bench allocation, asking why the matter was not placed before a bench comprising Justices BV Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, which had dealt with the petitions challenging the remission granted to the 11 convicts.

The two-page order of October 28 states that issues of fact and law arise in the appeals and grants bail subject to conditions to be imposed by the trial court. However, the survivor says she was not informed of the proceedings or afforded an opportunity to file a counter-affidavit addressing the convicts’ claims.

The convicts’ counsel has since disputed the suggestion that the proceedings were conducted without adequate hearing, stating that the matter had been listed on several occasions and that the bail applications were argued after hearings involving the parties. The procedural record and the question of whether the victim was properly notified remain central to the controversy.

The convictions themselves have not been overturned. The suspension of sentence and grant of bail operate pending the disposal of the appeals.

Liberty cannot eclipse the survivor’s right to be heard

The latest order has reopened a debate that the Supreme Court itself has addressed in earlier cases: how to balance a convict’s claim to liberty with the rights of a victim who has suffered grave and irreversible harm.

The legal system recognises the possibility of reform and relief for convicts. But those considerations cannot erase the procedural safeguards available to survivors, particularly in cases involving rape and murder.

Bano has said that she will challenge the order and has questioned how a decision affecting her case could be passed without informing or hearing her.

If the convicts are entitled to seek suspension of their sentences and bail, the survivor is equally entitled to an effective opportunity to contest the grounds on which that relief is sought.

The issue is therefore not only the liberty of two convicts, but also the credibility of a justice system that must ensure its procedures are fair to every party, especially those whose lives have been irrevocably changed by the crime.