The report had called for Indian control over data routing, emergency shutdowns and an indigenous satellite constellation before 2029 
Business

Satellite network a 'technology of geopolitical control': Think tank for hard limits on Starlink

The Kutniti Foundation had urged stringent security conditions for foreign satellite operators, citing risks to communications infrastructure and strategic autonomy

An Indian policy group has urged the government to impose stringent, non-negotiable security conditions on foreign satellite internet operators, warning that Elon Musk-owned Starlink could give the United States strategic leverage over India's communications infrastructure and potentially undermine the country's technological sovereignty.

In a report originally published in November 2024 and updated in October 2026, the Kutniti Foundation described Starlink as "a technology of geopolitical control", arguing that satellite broadband was increasingly becoming an instrument of military power, intelligence gathering and geopolitical influence rather than merely a commercial connectivity service.

The foundation called for mandatory routing of Indian internet traffic through domestic gateways, strict data localisation, independent emergency shutdown capabilities and safeguards against unilateral service withdrawal during national security emergencies.

It also urged the government to accelerate the development of an indigenous satellite constellation before 2029 to reduce dependence on foreign providers and strengthen India's domestic space industry.

๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ธ'๐˜€ ๐—œ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐—ฎ ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฟ๐˜† ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—น๐—ฎ๐˜†๐—ฒ๐—ฑ

Starlink, operated by Musk's SpaceX, uses a constellation of satellites in low Earth orbit to provide internet connectivity, particularly in remote and underserved regions where conventional broadband infrastructure is difficult or expensive to establish.

The company has been seeking entry into the Indian market since 2021. It secured key licences in June 2025 and authorisation from space regulator IN-SPACe the following month, but commercial services have yet to begin because of pending regulatory requirements.

Outstanding issues include final security clearances, foreign-investment approval and the framework for allocating satellite spectrum.

Officials are also examining whether Starlink's inter-satellite communication links could allow internet traffic originating in India to bypass domestic ground gateways, potentially complicating regulatory oversight.

Last week, Musk alleged that "oligarchs" were obstructing Starlink's entry into India, a claim rejected by the Ministry of Communications as baseless.

The ministry maintained that Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb and Jio Satellite Communications were at broadly the same stage of the approval process, with all three awaiting security clearances and spectrum allocation before launching commercial operations.

๐—–๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ป๐˜€ ๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐—จ๐—ฆ ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ณ๐—น๐˜‚๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ

The Kutniti Foundation argued that SpaceX's extensive relationship with the US defence and intelligence establishments demonstrated the strategic significance of satellite communications networks.

The report cited a $70 million Pentagon task order for Starshield services and a reported classified contract with the US National Reconnaissance Office to develop a network of reconnaissance satellites.

According to the foundation, the combination of satellite infrastructure, ground gateways and foreign legal jurisdiction could create vulnerabilities for countries that become heavily dependent on a privately operated international network.

It raised concerns about the possibility of Indian communications being exposed to foreign intelligence collection and questioned whether New Delhi would retain sufficient control over network operations during a security crisis.

These concerns represent potential risks identified by the policy group, rather than established evidence that Starlink has compromised Indian communications.

๐—จ๐—ธ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฒ ๐—ฒ๐˜…๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฑ

The report pointed to Ukraine's reliance on Starlink following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 as an example of the strategic implications of depending on privately controlled satellite infrastructure.

Starlink became an important communications service for Ukrainian civilians and military personnel after conventional telecommunications networks were disrupted.

However, disputes over the geographical availability of the network and restrictions on certain military applications highlighted the influence a commercial operator could exercise over access to essential communications.

In March 2025, Musk wrote: "My Starlink system is the backbone of the Ukrainian army. Their entire front line would collapse if I turned it off."

The foundation argued that such dependence demonstrated why governments should retain independent operational control over critical communications systems, particularly during emergencies and armed conflicts.

The report also referred to regulatory disputes involving Starlink in Brazil, South Africa, Namibia and Taiwan.

In Brazil, Starlink initially resisted an order to block access to social media platform X before complying after its accounts were frozen.

๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐˜ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜€ ๐—ฝ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—ฝ๐—ผ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฑ

The foundation recommended that foreign low-Earth-orbit satellite operators be required to route all Indian internet traffic through gateways located within the country, without allowing inter-satellite links to bypass domestic infrastructure.

It also proposed mandatory registration of user terminals and an independent, auditable mechanism enabling Indian authorities to suspend network operations when legally required.

The report called for lawful interception and data localisation arrangements governed exclusively by Indian law, with safeguards against potential access under foreign legislation, including the US CLOUD Act and Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

It further recommended contractual restrictions preventing satellite operators from unilaterally withdrawing services during a declared national emergency.

Financial penalties backed by escrow arrangements should be introduced to ensure compliance, the foundation said.

The report cited Taiwan's regulatory approach as an example, noting that legislative changes introduced in July 2026 allowed case-by-case exemptions from foreign-ownership restrictions, subject to national security considerations and conditions concerning domestic infrastructure.

๐—œ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜€ ๐˜€๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—น๐—น๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฒ ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐˜๐˜„๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ธ ๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ฑ

The foundation argued that India possessed substantial bargaining power because of its large telecommunications market, established space programme and growing private space industry.

It warned that allowing a dominant global satellite operator to establish a commanding position could weaken investment in domestic companies operating across satellite communications, Earth observation and launch services.

According to the report, investors might favour an established international provider with a large constellation and frequent launch capability over Indian startups developing competing technologies.

Such a shift could make it harder for domestic companies to raise capital, potentially reducing demand for Indian-built satellites, launch vehicles and associated manufacturing services.

The foundation estimated that approximately $1 billion had already been invested in India's emerging space industry through startups, public-sector entities and large corporations.

It urged the government to support the development of an indigenous mega-constellation before 2029, arguing that domestic satellite infrastructure would strengthen national security, technological independence and export opportunities.

๐——๐—ถ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐˜-๐˜๐—ผ-๐—บ๐—ผ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐—น๐—ฒ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐˜๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป

The report also highlighted the potential impact of satellite-to-mobile, or direct-to-cell, technology on India's telecommunications sector.

As satellite networks expand beyond conventional broadband services, the foundation warned that they could increasingly compete with established mobile operators such as Reliance Jio, Bharti Airtel and state-run BSNL.

Direct-to-cell technology enables compatible mobile devices to connect to satellites, potentially extending communications coverage to areas without terrestrial mobile networks.

The foundation argued that the emergence of such services would make regulatory oversight and domestic technological capabilities even more important.

While acknowledging the potential benefits of satellite broadband for remote connectivity, the report maintained that foreign operators should be allowed to enter India's market only under enforceable conditions protecting domestic communications, national security and technological sovereignty.

It called on policymakers to balance the expansion of satellite connectivity with the need to preserve India's strategic autonomy and ensure the long-term development of its indigenous space ecosystem.